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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
GERTRUDE H. SNYDER,
l'laintijf and Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 9936
ROBI~~RT

JAMES CLUNE and
ROY M. STOKES,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND ·OF CASE
·This is an action for personal injuries alleged to
have been received in an automobile accident on a
public highway in Utah County, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendants moved the lower court to dismiss
the action on the grounds that the Complaint of
plaintiff was barred by the Statute of Limitations.
The lower court denied the motion. Appellants then
petitioned this court for an Intermediate appeal
\Yhich was granted.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
.-\ppellants ask that the Order of the lower court
denying their motion to dismiss be reversed and
that the action be dismissed.
1
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STATEMENT ·OF F A:CTS
The followin·g facts are apparent from the
record or were agreed to by counsel at the 'hearing
on appeTlants' motion to dismiss.
1. This is an action for personal injuries alleged to have occurred in an automobile accident on
a public highway in /Utah County, Utah, on December 14, 1958.
2. Defendants and Appellants are not residents of the State of 'Utah, but reside in the State
of Californ ia, and as far is known have not been
in the State of Utah since the ·happening of this
accident.
1

3. It is conceded by plaintiff that defendants
and appellants, Robert James Clune and Roy M.
Stokes, could have 'been served with process at any
time since the happening of this accident on December 14, 1958, by serving the Secretary of State of
Utah, under the provisions of the Utah N on-Resident Motor Vehicle Act (41-12-8 UCA 1943).
4. Plaintiff filed the Complaint in question
(Civil No. 24751) in the office of the Utah County
Clerk on December 17, 1962- four years and three
days after the happening of the accident.
5. Plaintiff filed an earlier complaint in the
office of the Utah County Clerk (Civil No. 24555)
on December 13, 1961. Summons was not issued
on this complaint and, in fact, no action whatever
was taken by plaintiff after filing the complaint.
2
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Based on the obvious failure to file timely, defendants and appellan·ts moved the court to dismiss
the complaint upon the grounds that the four years
Statute of Limitations had expired. At the hearing
on the argument plain~tiff raised three points which
she alleges are a complete answer to her £ailure to
file within the period limited by s'tatute. ·These are:
1. That the filing on December 17, 1962 was
timely because of an intervenin;g weekend during
which time the office of 'the Utah ·County ~clerk was
legally closed.

2. That plaintiff filed !an action arising out
of this accident for these injuries on December 13,
1961 in Utah County ('Ciivil No. 24!5;5'5) on which
no action was taken, but which plaintiff claims had
the effect of e~tending the time for filing for one
year from December 13, 196'2.
3. That the absence of defendants from the
State of U·tah tolled the running of the Statute of
Lin1itations and, therefore, plaJintiff's action is
timely.
Defendants urge that neither of plaintiff's
arguments are sufficient and that the lower court
erred in denying defendants' motion to dismiss and
show this by further consideration of the points
raised by plaintiff.
3
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF'S C·OMPLAINT OF DECE'MBER 17,
1962 ('SEC'OND ~CTIO'N) WAS NOT FILED TIMELY.
THE F0 UR-YE'.NR STATUTE OF L:UMITA·TIONS HAD
RUN.
1

The plaintiff argues that at all events the filing
of the second cause of action 'on December 17, 1962
was 'timely and within ~he Four-Year Statute of
Limitations because December 14, t962 was a Friday ~and that she, therefore, could file on the following Monday (December 17, 1962) and 'stil~ be within the Four-Year Statute.
Time properly computed under our statute will
show th·at plaintiff's con'tenti'on is not sound. Computation of 'time is codified by our statute, Title
68-2-7 U'CA 19'53. The statute rea~ds:
'·'Time, how computed. - The time in which
any act provided by law is to be done is computed by excludling the first day 1and including the last, unl~ss the last is a holiday, and
then it also is ·excluded.''
The next succeeding section, ·68-3-8, makes provisions for acts that must be done on a particular
day which fal'ls upon ~a holiday. 'This section of the
statute reads.
"When a day appointed is a holiday.- Whenever any ·act of a secular nature, other than
'a work of necessity or mercy, is appointed by
law or contract to be performed upon a particular day, which day falls upon a holiday,
such act may be performed upon the · next
1

4
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succeeding business day with the same effect
as if it had been performed upon the day appointed."
To the san1e effect is Rule 6(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule provides:
~'Rule 6 Time (a) COMPUTA'TION. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act, event
or default after which the deslign1ated period
of time begins to run is not to be included.
The last day of the period so computed is to
be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal
holiday, in which event the period runs until
the end of the next day which is neither a
Sunday nor a holiday. When 'the period of
time prescribed or allowed is less th~an seven
days, intermediate Sundays and holidays shall
'be excluded in the computation. A h.alf holiday shall be con·sidered as dther days and not
as a holiday."
Plaintiff's cause of action accrued on December
1-!, 1958. That is the date of the accident as set forth
in plaintiff's complaint. That is the d·ate on which
plaintiff's right to commence an ~action came into
exiStence. The Four-Year Statute of Limitations ·applicable to tort actions would run against the claim
of plaintiff on December 14, 1962, at the end of
that day.
Computing the Four-Year Statute of Limitations under the lime statute and the Rules of Civil
Procedure, we see that December 14, 1H58, the day
the action accrued, is excluded and December 14,
5
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1962, a full four years thereafter, is included.

Plaintiff's action had to be commenced on or
before December 14, 19'H2 in order to toll the Statute of IJimitations. Filing thereafter was too late.
Plaintiff argues, however, that she 'had until the
following day in which to file her complaint and
that the following day was a Saturday and th~at the
office of the Utah County Clerk was legally closed
on that day and the next day W1as also 'a legal holiday and, therefore, she had until December 17, 1962
in whiCh to file timely.
'Since the Statute of Lim'itations expired on
December 14, 1962, a Friday and not a holi day,
pl aintiff' s argumen't is without merit.
Two Utah cases will illustrate 'these principles.
In the case of Nelson vs. Jorgenson, '242 P. 945
(Utah) an action was filed on a judgment, which
judgment had been entered on October 15, 1914. The
complaint in this case was filed October 16, 1922.
It would appear that the complaint of '0ctdber 16,
192'2 wa s filed one day a·fter th·e Statute had run.
However, tilie court held:
"It is conceded that October 15, 1922 was a
Sunday. The complaint alleges that the original judgment was obtained and entered in
the District Couit of Salt Lake County on
Octo'ber 15, 1'914. 'Section 5843 of Comp. Laws
Utah 1917 provides th~at the time in which
any act ·provided by law is to 'be done is computed by excluding the first day and includ'fng the 'last, unl'ess the last day is 'a holiday,
and then it 'is also exclu~ded. Was the action
1

1

1

1

1
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barred by the foregoing provisions of our Statute on the fifteenth day of October, 1922?
The language of the statute would se·em to
answer the question in the negative.
This case illustrates two points. First, the Eight\" ear Statute would have run eight years to the day
after the entry of judgment. In the case at bar, the
statute would 1·un four years to the d~ay after the
happening of the accident; namely, December 14,
1962. Second, that since the last day, or October 15,
1922, was a holiday, the complaint was timely filed
on the following day. In the case at bar, December
14, 1962, was a Friday; and, hence, our case and
the Jorgenson case are distinguishable. In the case
of: In Re Lynch's Estate, 2'54 P. 2·d 4·54 (Utah),
a motion to 1amend the judgment was denied on
November '22, 1952. Notice of Appeal was not filed
until December 23, 1952. The Court stated and held:
"Appellan t contends that by excluding November 2·2, the day of the act or event from
which the period of one month commences to
run, her time commenced to run on November
23, and that one month after November 23
giYes ·her all day of Decem~ber 23, the day
when the Notice of Appeal was filed. With
this reasoning, we do not agree.
1

·'In the present case, we exclude from our
calculations the day of the act or event after
which the designated period of time begins to
run, which is November 22, the day on which
the motion was overruled, and start counting
from the beginning of the twenty-third of that
month; from that time, one month would end
7
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at the expiration of the 22nd day of December, or ju~st before the 2·3rd commenced, which
marked the beginnin·g of another month. To
hold in accord·ance with appellant's argument
would require an overlapping of one day into
the next month and a longer period or greater
number of days than the month in question
contains.''
Fol'lowing the reasoning of In Re Lynch, to
permit pla'intiff to file on November 17, 1962 would
require .an overlapping of one day into the nex't year,
which is ~a period longer than that permitted by the
S·tatute of Limitations.
P·OINT II.
PLAI·NTI;FF''S AC·TI'ON FILED DEiCEMB'ER 13,
19'61, DID NO·T EXTEND THE TIME FO'R FJ:LING HER
SECOND A CTION.
1

Plaintiff filed an earlier ·Complaint in the District Court ('Civil No. 24'5'5'5) for identical injuries
arising out of the identical :accid€nt of December 14,
1958. That 'Complaint was filed December 1'3, 1961.
No action whatever was taken after the Complaint
wa~s filed. ·This action failed other th1an on 'fue merits
by the provisions of Rule 4. (b). 'This rule reads:
"Time of issuance of service. If an action is
commenced by 'the fil'ing of a Complaint, Summons must issue thereon within three months
from the date of such filing. The Summons
must be served within one year after the filing of the Complaint or the ~action will be
deemed dismissed, . . .''
Since Summons was not issued on this Complaint within lthe three months provided by the Rule,
1

8
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the action failed on March 13, 1961, three months
after the filing of the Complaint. Thus, the first
action of plaintiff failed on March 13, 19'6'2; however, the Statute of Limitationis had not run on
plaintiff's claim ·and plaintiff still had until December 14, 1962, in which to file a second action. This
was not done, however, until December 17, 1962.
Even if the Court were to hold that plaintiff's first
action had not failed until one year after it was
filed on December 13, 19'61, plaintiff still had until
December 14, 1962 in which to file the second action
before the lim'ita:tions statute would 'bar the claim.
Plaintiff :argues, however, that the failure of
the first a'ction otherwise than on the merits had
the effect of extending the time to file a second
action for a period of one year. To support this contention, plain tilff relies on the provi si'ons of Ti tie
78-12-40 U·CA 1953; we quote this statute,
"If any action is commenced within due time
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is
reversed, or if the plain-tjiff fails in such
action or upon a cause of ~action otherwise
than upon the merits, and the time limited
either by law or contract for commencing the
same shall have expired, plaintiff, or if he
dies and the cause of action survives, his representatives, may commence a new action
within on·e year after the reversal or failure.''
(Italics supplied)
The statute is clear in stating tha:t 'the time
limited for the commencement of the ·action must
1

1
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have ex·pired before the statute has ·any application.
Plaintiff's first action failed on March 13, 1'962, or
at the latest on December 13, 1962. After the failure
of the first cause of action, plaintiff still had 'to and
including December 14, 1962 to commence the second
action. H·aving failed to do so, her cause of action
is 'barred.
A 1similar savings statute 'has been interpreted
by the Oklahoma courts in Birmingham Fire Insurance Company v. Bond, 301 P. 2d 861 ('Okla.). The
Court sta:ted and held:
1

'·~The

filing of said former action of April 8,
194'9, did not h:ave the effect of extending the
period of limitations by invoking the application of 12 O.'S. 1941, Sec. 100. \The one-year
period in which the ·action could be filed did
no't expire until January 26, 1950. 'Therefore,
the filing ·and dismissal of the first action
several months previously in no way extended
the time. The Rule was first announced by
this Court in the case of Engl'ish v. 'T. H.
Rogers Lu·mber Comp1any, 68 Okla. 238, 173
P. 1046 104'7, wherein it was held that,
~The

statute giving to a plain'tiff the right
to commence a new action within one
year after the reversal or failure of his
original ~action was not intended to afford in all cases an ·additional time in
wHich to bring suit. By its terms 'the
tight i's conditioned upon the fact tfiat
"the tim·e limited for the same shall have
expired." 'Th·at is, but for the statute,
plaintiff's action would, at the time of
10
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the failure or reversal be barred by the
statute of lin1itation. Such is not the case
when the failure occurs !at a time when
the plaintiff has full opportunity to commence a new action.' "
'The U~tah statute is to the same effect. If the
reversal or :£ailure occurs after the statute of limitations h·a;s run, then the plaintiff has an additional
year in which to file a new action. However, if the
statute has not run on the date of the reversal or
failure, then the statute has no application. In this
case, the Four-Year Statute of Limitations expired
December 14, 1962. Plaintiff's first action £ailed
March 13, 1962, for failure to issue Summons; and
even if it were held that the action failed December
13, 1962, for failure to serve Summons wi'thin one
year, still plaintiff h·ad to ~and including the fourteenth day of December 196'2 to file the second action. lt must be concluded that the first ·action failed
before the Statute of Limitations h·ad run ·and, therefore, the extension s·tatute relied upon by pl·aintiff
had no ·application.
POINT III.
ABSENCE FROM THE STATE DOES NOT TO'LL
THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
IN .A NON-RESIDENT 'MOTORIST CASE.

Plaintiff relies on the provision's of 78-12-35
UCA 1953, which in substance provides that the
time a person is absent from the Sta'te of Utah is
not part of the period of time limited for the commencement of actions. Most juri'sdictions have a
11
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statute similar to the Utah statute, the purpose being to prevent a defendant from defeating a claim
by ·absenting :him'Self from the State. Here, however,
plaintiff could h~ave obtained jurisdiction over these
defendants at anytime after the happening of the
accident by serving the Secretary of State of Utah.
This identical problem has been decided by a number
of jurisdictions, the m!ajority of those holding that
the a'bS'ence 'Statute has no application to a non-resident motorist case and that the running of the Statute of Limitations is not tolled during the al>sence
of defendant where plaintiff could get personal service by serving a statutory ·agent.
The ·general rule is ·stated in 17 A.L.R. 2d '516:
"Where provision is made by statute for substituted service of process upon a state official in caS'es arising out of motor accidents
within the state, the majority of the courts
have held th:at such a provision has the effect
of nullifying any statute suspending the period of limitations.''
Those jurisdictions following the majority rule
are:
UNITED S'TA'TES.- Tublitz v. Hirschfeld (1941, CA2d NY) 118 F2d 29 ·(under
·Connecticut statute).
C·ONNECIT'FCU'T.-Coombs v. Darling
(1'9'33) 116 ·Conn. 653, 166 A 70.
ILLIN·OIS. - N e l·s on v. Rich1ardson
( 19'3'8 29'5 Ill. App 504, 15 NE2d 17.
A'2d 286.
12
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TENNESSEE - Arrowood v. McMinn
County ( 1938) 173 Tenn. 562, 121 SW2d
5HG, 119 ALR 855.
VERMONT. - Reed v. Rosen fie 1d
(1947) 115 Vt. 76, 51 A2d 189.
DEL. - Hurwitch v. Adams (Del.) 151
A.2d 286.
lOWA. - Kokenge v. Holthaus, 243
Iowa 571, 52 NW2d 711.
MO. - Haver v. Bassett, - Mo. App. ____ ,
287 SW2d 342 (citing annotation); Scorza v.
Deatherage (CA8th Mo.) ·208 F 2d 660.
N. H. - Bolduc v. Richards (NH) 142
A2d 156.
OKLA. - Moore v. Dunh·am (CA lOth
Okla.) '240 F2d 19'8 (Applying ·Oklahoma statute).
MICH. - Hammel v. Bet~ison, 362 Mich.
396, 107 NW2d 887.
OR. - Whittington v. Davis (Or.) 3'50
P2d 913.
We have selected the ca~se of Moore v. Dunham,
240 F2d 198, (10 c·cA. Okla.) as indicative of the
persuasive reasoning of the majority view. 'The 'Court
said:
"Oklahoma courts h1ave not construed Section
98 (absence statute) in connection with the
provisions for service of process under the
Non-Resident Motorist Act. But the majority,
and we think the better reasoned view, holds
that provisions for substituted service of process upon a state official arising out of motor
accidents within the state has the effect of
13
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nullifying any statute suspending the period
of limitations. ('citing cases)
":Such view is said to be consi;stent with the
purpose of substituted service, i.e. expeditious
adjudication of the rights of parties; that by
creating substituted service the legislature obviously intended to provide an exception to
this suspension provisi'on; and that a contrary
conclusion would permit a plaintiff to defer
the institution of his action indefinitely to
the prejudice of the defendant."
Plaintiff cites th:e Utah case of Keith O'Brien
Company vs. Snyder, 51 U. 227, 160 P. 9'54, which
held that where ·a person absent from the state maintains ·a residence where process could be served in
the sta:te, the Statute of Limitations was tolled during his ·absence.
'Th·a;t case was necessarily decided in part on
our service of process statute which then provided,
"The Summons must be served by delivering
a copy thereof as follows: . . . ( 8) In 1all other
cases to the defendant personally, or by leaving such copy at his usual place of abode with
some suitalJle persons of at least the age of
14 years.''
The decision of the Keith O'Brien case necess·a:rily involved that phrase of the statute "usual
place of abode". Service of process at the "usual
place of abode" is not always effective. In the case
of Gr,ant v. Lawrence, 108 P. 931 (decided earlier
than the Keith O'Brien casie) held, in ·an action to
set ·aside a judgment on the groun·d that no Sum14
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rnons had been served as required by this section,
\vhcre it appeared that plaintiff, while still married,
had taken a plural wife and had gone to En'gland
with her as a mission1ary, during which time his
first wife had built a house in Salt Lake City with
money furnished by plaintiff who had never seen
the house nor lived in it until he returned from
England; service on plaintiff while he was in England by leaving a copy of procesS; at the house of the
first wife was held insufficient since such house was
not plaintiff's "usu~al place of abode" within the
statute.
We thus see that service rat the "usual place of
abode" can be uncertain and ineffective to determine
the rights between parties. A judgment obtained on
such service could be set aside for want of jurisdiction many years later after substanti1al rights
of third parties had intervened.
Two important changes h·ave occurred in our
law since the decision in the Keith O'Brien case.
The Non-Resident Motorist Vehicle Act ( 4112-8) was passed in 1943. This statute provides in
part:
uThe use and operation by a nonresident or
his agent of ·a motor vehicle upon and over
the highways of the state of Utah shall be
deemed an appointment by such nonresident
of the secretary of state of 'the State of Utah,
to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom
may be served all legal processes in ·any ·action
or proceeding against him growing out of such
use or operation of a motor vehicle over the
15
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highways of this state resulting in damages
or loss to person or property and said use or
operation shall be a signification of his agreement th1at any such process shall, in any action against him which is so served, be of
the same legal force and validity as if served
upon him personally.''
In January of 19'50, th~e Rules of Civil Procedure 1amended the Service of Process Provisions of
the statute and now read as follows:
"Rule 4. (e) Personal service in this State.
Personal service within the state shall be as
follows:
Upon a natura;! person of the age
of fourteen years or over, by delivering a copy
thereof to him personally, or by leaving such
copy at ·his usua:l place of abode with some
person of suitable age and discretion there
residing; or by delivering a copy to an agent,
~authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process." (Italics supplied)
( 1)

The Legislature has provided that service upon
the S~ecretary of State is personal service and certainly there can be no uncertainty either in the terms
of such service or upon the person served. !The Secretary of State is ·a state office where service can be
had at any time. The problem created by the Grant
case and recognized by the Keith O'Brien case is
n·ot present. Rule 4. (e) Specifically recognizes such
person·al service "by delivering a copy to ·an a~gent
authorzied by appointment or law to receive service
of process.''
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As in the 1najority rule respecting the absence
statute in nonresident motorist cases, our Legislature and courts intended to nullify the a·bsence statute in non-resident motorist cases. When one considers that the policy of the law in general and the
non-resident motorist statute in particular, is to
bring about "expeditious adjudication of the rights
of parties", the ·application of the Utah 1absence statute would work an illogical and unjust result.
'To illustrate, we may consider the plight of a
Utah motorist who travels in a forei'gn state for the
first ~and last time and there has an accident. If
the absence statute of that state were applied, he
would 'be subject to suit at a time so remote that
all m'emory of the accident would be erase·d. Clearly,
he would be prejudiced thereby.
The situation most nearly resembling the nonresident motorist case is tha:t of a foreign corporation having a process agent in the state of Utah.
Such a corporation is ·a person (legally) ·and is absent from the state. Does the statute of limita:tions
ever run on a claim againSt the foreign corporation·?
This Court said that the Statute did run in the case
of Clawson vs. Boston Acme Mines Development
Company 269 P. 147 (Utah). Quoting the general
rule, the Court said:
~'The majority of decisions maintain ia rule
which it is ·believed is more consonant with
justice. The Rule, briefly stated, is that if,
under the laws of the domestic state, the corporation has placed itself in such position
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th·a;t it may be served with process, it may
:avail itself of the Statute of Limitations when
sued. Ability to obtain service of proce'Ss is
the test of the running of 'the Statute of Limitlations."
The test of whether the Statute of Limitations
will run is the ability 'to obtain service of process.
That is the Utah Rule applied to qualifying foreign
corporation'S and should be the rule in 'the ca'se of
a non-resident motorist. The foreign corporation
and th~e non-resident motorist s·tand on the same
footing ·as re'gards their absence from the state and
stand on the same footing as regards service of process. Just as a qualifying foreign corporation must
1appnint a process agent, the non-resident motorist
·appoints the S~ecretary of State his ·agent for the
·purpose of 'service of process by operating a vehicle
on 'the public highways of this state.
To hold that 'the Absence Statute applies to
non-resident motorists on the authority of the Keith
O'Brien case (supra) on the one bland ·and then to
hold th·at it does not apply to ·a foreign corporation
on the authority on the Clawson case (supra) on
the other hand, would reach results diametrically
opposed on identical legal principles.
Appellants urge that 'the rule ado·pted by the
majority of jurisdictions as regards the Absence
Statute in non-resident m·otorists cases, be adopted
by this 'Court. It is ·a rule founded on l~ogic and reason
·and is squarely 1aligned with the Utah Rule on qualifying foreign corporations which the non-resident
motorist case is most closely ·akin.
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CONCLUSION
1. Plaintiff's action filed December 17, 1962,
for injuries received December 14, 1958, was not
timely. The Statute of Limitations had run on December 14, 1962.

2. The action filed by plaintiff (the identical
accident and injuries) on December 13, 1961, failed
because summons was not issued within three months
and did not have the effect of extending the filing
period for one year because the time limited for
filing had not expired on the date the action failed.
3. The Utah absence statute has no application to a non-resident motorist case where jurisdiction can be obtained at any time by service of process on the Secretary of State.
For the reasons set forth above, the action of
plaintiff is barred by the four year Statute of Limitations. The order of the district court must be reversed and the action of plaintiff dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
Attorneys for
Defendants and Appellants

19
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

